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Some Problems of the Peace Conference. By Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Pp. viii+310.

That gathering of representatives from the many nations which were either actively or passively engaged in the World War, and which assembled in Paris, January 18, 1919, has been the subject of more comment and more criticism than any other body of modern times. Many who had a part in it, and more who had none, have undertaken to write their impressions of its deliberations. Some of these have real historical value, others have been composed with so evident a bias that they can be classed only with "promotion" literature. "Inside histories" by those who were never inside, and confidential disclosures by those in whom no one ever placed any confidence have been plentiful. This volume is almost the only one written by men who had a large share in the deliberations of the Conference and who were at the same time possessed of the minds of trained historians. Professor Haskins was attached to the American delegation as Chief of the Division of Western Europe, and was the American member of the special committee of three which drafted the treaty clauses on Alsace-Lorraine and the Saar Valley. Professor Lord served as American adviser on Poland and related problems, both at Paris and in Poland itself. The reputation of both in the historical world is too well known to need repetition here. Professor Lord's recent conversion to the Catholic Church gives him an added personal interest for Catholics.

In the first chapter Professor Haskins takes up the "Tasks and Methods of the Conference" and shows that this body, far from being "a long drawn-out farce," as the *Wall Street Journal* in its crass historical ignorance and grossly materialistic viewpoint, called it, "was an expeditious body" (p. 3) and accomplished much, despite the fact that "no peace congress had ever confronted so colossal a task" (p. 6). The disappointment which many have felt and expressed has been occasioned, Professor Haskins feels, by the fact that "beautiful, extravagant, heart-breaking hopes were centered" on it and on "the leader of the American delegation and his programme," which "hopes were in large measure inevitably doomed to disappointment" (p. 7). Moreover, many have

forgotten "that the function of the Paris Conference was not to do abstract justice in every corner of the earth, but to make peace with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey" (p. 14). He gives many cogent reasons why it was practically impossible to divorce the question of the League of Nations from the rest of the treaty, and as the detailed treatment of the different problems proceeds, these appear the more evident. It makes one heart-sick and almost despondent to realize how nearly the monumental work of this Conference has been overthrown because of "the failure of America to ratify the treaties and to take part in carrying out their provisions," especially when one realizes that the failure was a piece of deliberate political trickery, undertaken for the sole purpose of discrediting the administration which had conducted the War successfully, and which was about to close with a still greater achievement to its credit.

Chapters II, III, and IV, dealing respectively with "Belgium and Denmark," "Alsace-Lorraine" and "The Rhine and the Saar" are the work of Professor Haskins; the remainder of the book was written by Professor Lord.

The contrast between neutral Denmark, which "saw all her desires gratified in Schleswig" (p. 48) without having done anything in the War to gain them, and bleeding Belgium, whose heroic resistance to uphold an abstract right, but whose treatment made her "dissatisfied with her whole treatment at the Conference" (p. 49), is strongly brought out, yet one is forced to the conclusion that nothing better could be done and that "the destruction of German militarism and the protection of small states against the imperial ambitions of Germany" (p. 71) have been accomplished thereby. Yet how it is to be made permanent does not appear in the present state of things for we must agree that "for the future Belgium's security lies in a strong League of Nations and in what such a League stands for" (*ibid*).

More even than the problem of Belgium's rights—claims which sprang up with the War—the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France was the first thought which entered the minds of nearly all pro-Allies from the moment the first gun was fired. The settlement of this thousand-year-old problem—the adjustment of the relation of these border provinces

to their neighbours—was already determined upon in the event of an Allied victory. "The Peace Conference had only to determine certain necessary details." (p. 75.) These were, however, not altogether easy. Language, religion, political status, economic advantage, all entered in, but the final determination was based upon righting the wrong of '71 and upon the necessities, military and economic, which the establishment of the various new frontiers brought forth. Both parties concerned must learn to live in that state of comity which will make for international betterment, for "after all the nub of the situation is that France needs coal and Germany needs iron, and sooner or later it will be necessary to exchange one for the other" (p. 113).

In the question of "The Rhine and the Saar" there is not so much sentiment, and the Conference gave due attention to the views of both sides. "To German geographers and historians the Rhine is a German river, by nature and history, its valley forming a physiographic unity, itself the great highway of Germany" (p. 117). On the other hand "there have not been lacking in France certain historians and geographers who have maintained that the Rhine was the natural frontier of France, "as it had been of Roman Gaul" (p. 118). Which is right? Or is either? Professor Haskins thinks that "to one who approaches the matter without nationalistic prepossessions the fate of the Rhine valley seems to have been determined, not by any geographic necessity, but by the vicissitudes of history" (pp. 118-19). Taking into consideration the questions of the free navigation of the Rhine, and the use of its water-power, the provisions of the Conference were adopted with the feeling that "the demilitarization of the Left Bank was an elementary demand of national, and international, security" (p. 130).

The giving of the Saar basin with its mines to France he regards as a matter of "elementary justice" (p. 143), even though, so far as the inhabitants are concerned, "if they had been consulted, they would doubtless have voted to remain with Germany" (p. 140). The treaty provided for "the government of the Saar basin by a commission of the League of Nations," which is regarded as a "very interesting experiment in international administration" (p. 149) and it seems to Dr.

Haskins that "by its success or failure in such matters the League will be in large measure judged by Western Europe" (ibid).

With the treatment of Poland, Professor Lord assumes the responsibility for this work, and while the style differs from that of Professor Haskins, the calm, dispassionate historical expert shows forth just the same. He takes up the problem presented by Poland and shows how really difficult it was. "Through President Wilson's efforts, the principle of the restoration of a united and independent Poland was definitively and unequivocally inscribed among the war aims of the Allies" (p. 156), but then the question arose, "What was Poland?" Its boundaries were very inexact; its people, its language, its influence, and its history did not coincide with such frontiers as could be determined, and if peace and justice were to be secured these must all be taken into account. While trying "to be scrupulously fair to the Germans" (p. 174) so many collisions of interests occurred that Professor Lord feels "of all parts of the Versailles Peace Treaty, there is perhaps none which it required greater moral courage to make or which it may be more difficult to uphold than the Polish-German settlement" (p. 172). The prominence into which Upper Silesia has been thrust within the past few months shows that not all the difficulties were satisfactorily worked out even so.

Another problem connected with Poland is that of the Ruthenians. This is given an adequate treatment, and is valuable because that same race is creating no small Catholic problem in the United States and Canada.

Austria, which came out of the War with about the most unhappy lot of any belligerent, Professor Lord feels brought this condition upon herself, for the old Hapsburg monarchy, which was based upon the principle of *divide et impera*, fell to pieces of its own weight, once the plotters at Vienna were rendered powerless, and "the main problem before the Conference therefore was, while making peace . . . to effect a definite division of the Hapsburg inheritance that would be just, practical and conducive to the peace and security of Europe" (p. 210). To form new states so as to treat with justice German Austrians, Czechs, Slovaks, Magyars, and all

the other multitude of races embraced in Austria's former dominions was a formidable task. No wonder the solution was not altogether satisfactory. Here again all faith was pinned to later adjustments through the League of Nations. The Conference's veto of the proposed union of German-Austria with Germany, he feels was an error, though confessedly done, not to make Austria suffer, but because "it is only after she (Germany) has successfully passed a period of probation and has shown that she has fundamentally changed her methods and her point of view, that the rest of the world can accord her such aggrandizement" (p. 227).

The settlement of the questions concerning "Hungary and the Adriatic" was planned in such a way as to foster racial unity and to put an end to "the most odious system of racial oppression known to modern Europe" (p. 235), and the same broad outline was in view in the attempts of the Conference to settle the Balkan question. Recent events show that these efforts were not altogether successful, but that is not so much the fault of those who gave their thought to the matter, as to the present inchoate and impotent state of the League.

Recognizing that "the treaty of Versailles . . . is by no means a perfect instrument" but declaring that "it represents an honest effort to secure a just and durable settlement" (p. 31) of the problems growing out of the War, the facts as set forth in this volume increase the reader's disgust with that brand of "peanut politics" which made the whole instrument a campaign document, and at that so-called statesmanship which so prejudiced our people about it for partisan ends. Had this volume been written for popular use, it might have had a large effect on the campaign of 1920. At any rate it is a vindication of the part the representatives of the United States played at Paris, an *apologia pro operibus suis* and a most valuable bit of real history.

FLOYD KEELER, A.M., S.T.B.

Education and Social Movements, 1700-1850. By A. E. Dobbs. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1919. Pp. 257.

The main social movements which affected education in England during the Eighteenth and the first half of the Nine-